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Introduction 
 
In September 1880 (the 13th year of Meiji for Japan, the 17th year of King 
Kojong for Korea, and the 6th year of Emperor Guang-xu for China), an 
epoch-making document in the history of international relations in early 
modern East Asia was drafted. It was “Chao-xian Ce-lue” (Korean Strategy) 
by Huang Zun-xian. Not only the nature but also the contents of this work, 
parts of which will be introduced in this paper, are astonishing indeed. It 
declared in a decisive way the fact that international relations in East Asia 
were breaking away from the traditional Chinese world order and shifting 
toward a modern international order. Also, it clearly presented a 
geopolitical map of the emerging modern East Asia probably for the first 
time, in a global perspective and in a brutal manner. Moreover, it tragically 
foretold the history of modern international relations that was to unfold in 
East Asia in subsequent years. It would not be an exaggeration to say that 
Huang Zun-xian’s “Chao-xian Ce-lue” was a work of destiny that 
determined the modern history of East Asia. 
Huang Zun-xian authored this document during his stay in Japan. As 
a councilor  (“can-zan”) to He Ru-zhang who was Qing’s first envoy to 
Japan, Huang  (1848–1905, alias Gong-du, a native of Jia-ying county, 
Guangdong province and a Hakka) was 33 years old and in the fourth year 
of his posting to Japan at the time. At the age of 29, he had passed the 
difficult higher civil service examination and almost immediately been 
given a diplomatic posting to Japan by He Ru-zhang. As soon as positioned 
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in Tokyo, Huang saw it as his assignment to collect information on Japan 
for Minister He. Moreover, as he believed he had found in Japan a peaceful 
living and culture, which had been lost in the turmoil of his homeland, and 
even a Utopia, he quickly began his Japanese studies, the fruits of which 
were compiled later in his writings, Riben Zashi Shi (Poems on Japanese 
Miscellany)1) and Riben Kuo1zhi (Notes on Things Japanese)2). The 
Chinese legation, staffed with many literati like He and Huang, was often 
visited by those traditional Japanese who were fans of classical Chinese 
culture. Conversing by means of writing, they asked the Chinese officials 
for discussions on Chinese culture and remarks on their written 
Chinese-style poems. They included Ishikawa Kosai, a scholar of Chinese 
literature, Okochi Kisei, former lord of the Takasaki Domain, and Miyajima 
Seiichiro, an unattached official of the Japanese Public Record Office3). As 
he discussed with them subjects such as cherry-blossom picnics and 
sensuality as a refinement of literati, Huang rapidly deepened his 
knowledge of Japanese culture4). 
In the midst of this mundane situation, on August 11, 1880, a mission 
of the second “sushinsa” (special diplomatic envoy) from Korea, headed by 
Kim Hong-Jip, arrived on a visit to Japan. The diplomatic tasks assigned to 
Kim were to persuade the Japanese government to withdraw its request for 
opening the port of Incheon and stationing a Japanese minister in Seoul, 
and to let Korea continue the collection of import duties at the port of 
Pusan and the export ban on rice. He Ru-zhang, on the other hand, had his 
own diplomatic problems with Japan. They included the Ryukyu question 
which had been at issue from the beginning of his assignment and put him 
in a position to seek a basic framework for China’s East Asian policy.  
During his stay in Japan, Kim visited Qing’s legation six times, as 
Qing was the suzerain to Korea, to exchange with He opinions on 
diplomatic policy 5). On September 6, two days before Kim’s departure for 
Korea, the Qing legation presented him with “Chao-xian Ce-lue” (Korean 
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Strategy), written by Huang6). It was a policy paper par excellence that 
stated Korea’s basic diplomatic policy. Nevertheless, Huang, under 
instructions from He, prepared the paper in about ten days7). The policies 
in it were not totally original with Huang, of course. There had already 
been exchanges of opinions between Minister He and Li Hong-zhang on 
China’s Korean policy and He’s policy position toward Korea had been 
nearly determined, with Li’s understanding. There is no doubt that it was 
with the intentions of Minister He taken into account that Huang drafted 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue”8). 
Upon his return home, Kim Hong-Jip submitted “Chao-xian Ce-lue” 
together with a report on his negotiations with Japanese government 
officials. On October 11, the “Chunghidang” meeting had a full-scale 
discussion on “Chao-xian Ce-lue”. Through his visit to Japan, Kim had 
come to believe in “the necessity for an open-door and enlightenment policy 
to increase the wealth and power of the nation,” and he commended the 
proposals in “Chao-xian Ce-lue” to King Kojong and the ministers of the 
imperial court9). Thereupon Kim became the central figure promoting 
Korea’s enlightenment policy. By the end of 1881, the Korean government 
set up the “Tongligimuamun” (Ministry of General Affairs) to steer a course 
toward an open-door policy. However, such an open-door and enlightenment 
policy unleashed strong movements against it, led by Confucian scholars 
who were out of office.  
 
I. On Different Texts of “Chao-xian Ce-lue” and their Lineage 
 
1. Different Texts 
 
When referring to Huang Zun-xian’s “Chao-xian Ce-lue”, historians 
ordinarily use the text of “Chao-xian Ce-lue” contained in “Sushinsa Diary 
Vol. 2” in Volume 9 Sushinsa Kirok of Han’gok saryo ch’ongso (Materials for 
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Korean History)10) edited by the Korean Committee for Editing the 
National History11). Needless to say, the Sushinsa Kirok is an official record 
left by Kim Hong-Jip, the special diplomatic envoy (“sushinsa”) who 
brought Huang ’s “Chao-xian Ce-lue” to Korea from Japan. Thus, it would 
be natural to regard the “Chao-xian Ce-lue” contained in the official record 
as authentic. Indeed, it is natural to conceive that the original text of 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue” submitted by Kim to the King had been in custody and 
the committee in charge of editing the national history reprinted it to make 
up historical materials (by printing it in type and adding punctuation 
marks). However, there are a number of different texts of “Chao-xian 
Ce-lue.” Moreover, an examination and collation of these texts makes one 
doubt if the text contained in Sushinsa Kirok is identical to the original 
text. 
In addition to the above text, first, there is a “Chao-xian Ce-lue” in 
“Sushinsa Diary” which is contained in Kim Hong-Jip’s Posthumous 
Writings edited by the Central Library of Korean University (published by 
Korean University Press in 1976)12). It is a hand-written text. It is said that 
a manuscript of  “Chao-xian Ce-lue” stored in the Central Library 
collection was facsimiled to make this text, but it is unknown when the 
manuscript was hand-written or in what shape the original text had been. 
It seems quite likely that “Chao-xian Ce-lue” in the documents left by Kim 
Hong-Jip was copied by hand. However, this text has punctuation marks 
that were apparently added at a later time. This second text is very similar 
to the text published by the Korean Committee for Editing the National 
History, but not totally identical. A third of the texts which the author has 
in hand is the main text in Huang Zun-xian’s Chao-xian Ce-lue published 
by Kenkok University Press with translation and annotations by Professor 
Cho Il-Mun13). The text used by Professor Cho is a hand-written one like 
the Korea University Press version. It is likely to be a photocopy of an 
original woodcut text that is presumed to have been a text printed by 
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engraved wood and circulated within Korea at the time. This text has no 
punctuation marks and differs from the aforementioned two in many 
respects.  
A fourth text is a “Chao-xian Ce-lue” contained as Annex 1 of 
Document No.136 in “Item 7: Visit of Sushinsa from Korea to Japan” in 
Vol.13 (13th year of Meiji, 1880) of Nihon Gaiko Monjo (Japan’s diplomatic 
records), compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan14). This text 
is by type-printing like the text by the Korean Committee for Editing the 
National History and like it has punctuation marks. This text is, in a sense, 
the Japanese version of the Korean printed text, and it is often referred to 
partly because of its ease of use for Japanese students. However, it differs 
substantially from not only the two Korean transcript texts but also from 
the printed text published by the Korean Committee for Editing the 
National History. 
Finally, as the fifth, the author has at hand a hand-written text 
apparently produced by the Japanese side. It was “discovered” years ago by 
a student participating in my graduate school seminar, at the Chinese 
classics section in the Library of the Faculty of Letters, University of 
Tokyo15). This fifth text has been little known among students until now. It 
is a private print, pen-and-inked on Japanese writing paper and bound in 
Japanese style, and on its front cover it bears only the title “Chao-xian 
Ce-lue.” At the far left column on one of the pages of the text is written in 
ink, in a slightly different hand from the hand in the text, “Owned by 
Shojiro Nakamura, March, the 15th of Meiji  (1882).” In the center of the 
same page, in another, different hand, there is a note in two columns that 
reads, “Given by the Old Shojiro Nakamura, August, the 7th of Showa, 
Shimpei”. In other words, this document was given by Mr. Shojiro 
Nakamura to someone whose name was Shimpei (a given name) in 1929 
and somehow found its way to a library at Tokyo University. Further, one of 
the four seals stamped on the second page can be made out as “ Nakamura 
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Collection”. This fifth text is not identical to either of the other four. What 
kind of text is it? Specifically, what connection does it have to the text in 
Japanese diplomatic records? 
To sum it up, we deal with five different texts of Huang Zun-xian’s 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue” (Korean Strategy) in this paper. For the convenience of 
later discussions, they have been labeled Texts A, B, C, D and E, 
respectively. Namely, they are: 
Text A: Sushinsa Kirok edited by the Korean Committee for Editing the 
National History, printed in type 
Text B: Kim Hong-Jip’s Posthumous Writings, transcript 
Text C: Professor Cho Il-Mun’s annotation version, transcript 
Text D: Japanese diplomatic records version, printed in type 
Text E: Shojiro Nakamura text, transcript. 
The total number of Chinese characters used in “Chao-xian Ce-lue” is 5,952, 
based on the Shojiro Nakamura text (i.e., Text E) that is written with no 
punctuation and space on writing paper with 13 columns and 18 characters 
per column16). 
 
2. Differences among the Five Texts 
 
As pointed out earlier, the five texts are not identical. First of all, the title 
is  “Chao-xian Ce-lue/ Privately drafted by Huang Zun-xian of Guangdong” 
for Texts A, B and C, while for Texts D and E on the Japanese side, it reads, 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue/ privately drafted by Huang Zun-xian/ “can zan” for 
Minister stationed in Japan/ a native of Guangdong.”17)  
Let us now look at the very first paragraph of “Chao-xian Ce-lue.” The 
text by the Korean Committee for Editing the National History (Text A), for 
example, has it as follows: 
 
?????????????????????????????????
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?????????????????????????????????
???稯?????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????瓴???
???????????????????? 18) 
 
Table below shows all the wordings of this paragraph that differ between 
any two of the five texts. 
 
Table  Different Wordings among the Five Texts of Huang Zun-xian’s 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue”, First Paragraph only 
Page?line     Text A      Text B      Text C      Text D      Text E 
    0??? ?????? ? ? same as A? ? ? ?????? ? ? same as A? ? ? same as A 
    0??? ????? ? ? ? same as A? ? ? same as A? ? ? same as A? ? ? ? ??? 
    0??? ??????? ? same as A? ? ? same as A? ? ? ? ?????? ? same as D 
    0??? ????? ? ? ? ?????? ?  same as A      same as A       same as A 
    0??? ?????? ? ? ???????  same as B      same as B       same as B 
    0??? ????? ? ? ? same as A? ? ? ????? ? ? ? ????? ? ? ? same as D 
    0??? ?????? ? ? same as A? ? ? ?????? ? ? ????? ? ? ? ????? 
    0??? ?????? ? ? same as A? ? ? ?????? ? ? ?????? ? ? same as D 
    0??? ?????? ? ? same as A? ? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? same as D 
    0??? ??????? ? same as A? ? ? ??????? ? same as C? ?  ?????? 
    0??? ???????? same as A? ? ? ???????? same as A       same as A 
    0??? ?????? ? ? same as A? ? ? ?????? ? ? same as A       same as A 
    0??? ??????? ? same as A? ? ? ??????? ? ??????? ?????? 
    0??? ????瓴??? same as A? ? ? ???????? ????瓴??? same as C 
    0??? ?????? ? ? same as A? ? ? same as A? ? ? ??????? ?  same as D 
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    0??? ???????? same as A? ?  same as A       same as A? ? ? ????? 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?     ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ???? 
    Note: “Page?line” at the left of each line indicates the page and the line   
          where the phrase is found in Han’gok Saryo Ch’ongso, vol.9 
(Text                        A). Page’s first two digits are 
omitted here; thus “0?7” stands for page 160, line 7 of Text A. 
 
This table lists parts, in terms of phrases, of the five texts that present any 
difference in wordings. “Differences in wordings by any measure” include 
differences in one or two Chinese characters used, omissions or additions of 
one or two Chinese characters, reversals of word order, and omissions of 
several characters in a unit19). Table 1 is a part of the table produced for 
the entire text of “Chao-xian Ce-lue.” Counting by the entire table reveals 
that though the five texts were supposedly transcribed from the same 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue,” there are all together 466 phrases that have some 
differences from one text to another. Here, “phrases” are adopted as a unit 
of convenience in counting such differences, dividing the text into “phrases” 
on the basis of the punctuation marks applied to Sushinsa kirok (Text A) by 
the Korean Committee for Editing the National History20). The total 
number of phrases in the full “Chao-xian Ce-lue” text, added up by 
counting the punctuation marks, amount to 1,047. Thus, 44.5% of the 
entire phrases have some differences between any two of the five texts.  
     Some may wonder if the five texts, with this high percentage of 
non-conformity, were truly transcribed from the same “Chao-xian Ce-lue.” 
However, in most cases the difference involves the variance of one or two 
characters in a phrase, rather than the whole phrase. Presuming that on 
average two characters in a phrase show a variance, the total number of 
non-conforming characters accounts for just 15.6% of the total characters in 
the text. Moreover, the non-conformity is only to the extent that most of the 
non-conforming characters are similar to each other or the word order is 
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slightly different. On the whole, therefore, it is doubtless that the five texts 
were transcribed from the same “Chao-xian Ce-lue.” On the other hand, the 
fact that over 40% of the phrases have some variances suggests that 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue” had an eventful creation and transformation, with 
many different texts produced by repeated acts of hand transcribing. The 
fact that the text as a whole is nearly identical, but that there are many 
slight variances, is a significant factor we cannot overlook to clarify the 
nature of “Chao-xian Ce-lue” as a political document21).  
Let us now look at the quantitative conformity and non-conformity 
among the five texts. Between Text A and Text B, there are 32 phrases that 
show variances in wordings (in other words, the two texts – Text A and Text 
B – are identical for 1,015 phrases). In this case, the non-conformity ratio, 
or the ratio of different phrases to the total phrases, stands at 3%. 
Compared to the non-conformity ratios for the other combinations of two 
texts, that between Text A and Text B is indeed very low. Nevertheless, 
even these two pieces, that are supposed to have been closest to the original 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue” by Huang Zun-xian himself (the original text, which is 
hereafter referred to as Text H), have distinctive though slight differences 
between them. The number of different phrases between Professor Cho 
Il-Mun’s annotation version (Text C) and Text A amounts to 248 (with a 
non-conformity ratio of 23.7%) and the comparable figure between Text C 
and Text B is 241 (a non-conformity ratio of 23.0%). The discrepancy 
between the two non-conformity ratios is not significant enough to 
determine if Text C is closer to Text B than to Text A. 
What are the conformity and non-conformity between the three texts 
on the Korean side and the two on the Japanese side? A total of 371 
different phrases can be found between the Japanese diplomatic records 
version (Text D) and Text A (a non-conformity ratio of 35.4%). Between Text 
D and Text B, there are 369 different phrases (a non-conformity ratio of 
35.2%), and between Text D and Text C, there are 397 (a non-conformity 
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ratio of 37.9%). Thus, the degree of non-conformity is highest between Text 
D and Text C. On the other hand, there are 361 different phrases between 
the Shojiro Nakamura text (Text E) and Text A (a non-conformity ratio of 
34.5%). Compared to the figure between Text D and Text A, the degree of 
non-conformity is slightly lower. Differences in phrases (with corresponding 
non-conformity ratio) between Text E and Text B, and between Text E and 
Text C, are 359 (34.3%) and 384 (36.7%) respectively. Finally, a comparison 
between the two pieces on the Japanese side – Text D and Text E – shows 
58 different phrases (a non-conformity ratio of 5.5%). This indicates that 
the two texts on the Japanese side are very far from the three texts on the 
Korean side, and fairly close to each other. 
The aforementioned rough comparison clearly indicates that it is 
inappropriate to rely on Text A or Text D, solely because they are published 
texts. Even a simple quantitative comparison indicates that there are 
problems with Text D in particular.  
 
3. Relationship among the Five Texts 
 
Let us now consider the relationship among the five texts through a 
comparative study of specific expressions used in them. First, what 
relationships exist between Text A and Text B? As stated earlier, there are 
32 different phrases between the two. As shown in the table above, two 
cases of the different phrases in the first paragraph of the two texts are “?
???” (Text A) and “?????” (Text B), and “?????” (Text A) and 
“??????” (Text B). “?????” in Text B may be attributable to a 
transcription error. The phrase “????” from Text A is used in Texts C, D 
and E too. On the other hand, with regard to the second difference, the “?
?????” used in Text B seems much better, with Texts C, D and E using 
the same phrase. Of the other phrases that appear in the later part of the 
paragraph, as for “????” (Text A , p.171, line 5) against “?????” 
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(Text B), it is clear that the latter is a transcription error, with the other 
three texts adopting the same phrase as Text A. For “??????” (Text A ,  
p.164, line2) against “??????” (Text B), and “?????” (Text A, 
p.164, line 10) against “?????” (Text B), the phrases in Text B are 
obviously correct. On the whole, for the phrases that differ between Text A 
and Text B, where Texts C, D and E adopt the same wordings as in Text A 
or Text B, they adopt the same wordings as Text A in 17 instances, and as B 
in 33 instances. Although Texts C, D and E cannot be used to make a 
neutral judgment on the differences between Text A and Text B, a point to 
be elaborated later, it is obvious from this discussion alone that we cannot 
necessarily regard Text A as the best text for “Chao-xian Ce-lue.” 
     Text A and Text B are no doubt very close to each other. It is clearly so 
because Kim Hong-Jip was directly involved in them; the texts themselves 
prove it. It is unlikely, however, that either Text A or Text B is the true 
original text (Text H), while it can be reasonably assumed that the two are 
very close to the original. Presumably, Text A and Text B were transcribed 
from the original on different occasions, and it is reasonable to think that 
many of the differences in wordings between the two were caused by 
transcription mistakes. Whatever the case may have been, it is also 
possible that the original text, i.e. Text H, itself contained errors. The fact 
that Huang Zun-xian had to write down the text during such a short period 
of time makes it probable that there were some errors in the original text. 
Text C is believed to have been a derivative of a group that included 
Texts A and B. However, because of the aforementioned high degree of 
non-conformity between Text C and Texts A and B, it is reasonable to 
assume that Text C is substantially distant from both Text A and Text B. 
Text C is most likely an outcome of a long series of repeated transcription 
starting from a copy that came out of the Court by transcription. The 
aforementioned non-conformity ratio is insufficient to determine whether 
Text C derived from the line of Text A or that of Text B. 
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On the other hand, it is apparent from glancing at the table of 
different phrases that Text D and Text E – the two pieces from the 
Japanese side – are further distant from Texts A and B than is Text C. A 
comparison of the non-conformity ratio only reaffirms the fact. A much 
more interesting fact is that Texts D and E are not only much deviated 
from Text C, but also the degrees of non-conformity between Text D and 
Text C and between Text E and Text C are the highest. In other words, it 
could be assumed that Texts D and E do not belong to the line of Text C, 
but they are transcripts of other texts that were circulated. It is said that 
in Korea at that time there were a variety of transcripts of “Chao-xian 
Ce-lue” in circulation and this is another proof of that. The fact that the 
titles of Texts D and E differ distinctively not only from Texts A and B, but 
also from Text C, and also the fact that they have much more explanation 
about Huang Zun-xian, the author, indicate that they are much further 
from Texts A and B than is Text C. 
Finally, what are the relationships between Text D and Text E, the two 
texts from the Japanese side? Given the facts that the titles are nearly 
identical22) and that the degree of non-conformity between the two is as low 
as 5.5%, it is safe to say that the two are clearly close to one another. Are 
they identical? The Japanese diplomatic document that contains Text D 
includes a note stating that, “related to the accomplishment of the mission 
that visited Japan, . . . there was Huang Zun-xian’s “Chao-xian Ce-lue,” 
and on March 29 of the next year, this was sent to this office from Consul 
General Maeda in Wonsan, Korea.”23) In other words, Consul General 
Kenkichi Maeda, who was stationed in Wonsan, acquired the copy and sent 
it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. On the writing paper of Text 
E, on the other hand, one can read through masking ink a letter head 
saying “Consulate of Japan, Port of Wonsan, Korea”. It was written on 
official writing paper for the Consulate of Japan in Wonsan. Who, then, 
was Shojiro Nakamura, the person who owned this copy (Text E) in March, 
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the 15th of Meiji (1882)? It is confirmed that he served as charge d’affaires 
at the Consulate of Japan in Wonsan, at least during the period from 
October 1880 to February 1882. The Consul General at the time was of 
course Kenkichi Maeda24). From these two records, it seems reasonable to 
assume that Consul General Maeda acquired a copy of “Chao-xian Ce-lue” 
from Shojiro Nakamura of his consular staff, and that Nakamura 
submitted the copy to Consul General Maeda, having acquired or 
transcribed the document that was in circulation outside of the consulate. 
Thereafter, as of the spring of 1882, Nakamura might have possessed the 
text when it had become unneeded after its copy had been sent to Tokyo, or 
a transcript he had made. It is not definite but probable that Text E was 
the original for Text D. 
Why, then, are there as many as 58 differences in wordings between 
the two texts? The primary cause is transcription errors. If a copy of the 
text obtained by Nakamura outside the Consulate was sent to Tokyo, it 
might have been transcribed at least twice by Nakamura himself and/or by 
some other person. The second cause would be errors committed in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the reproduction of the text for inclusion 
into Japan’s diplomatic records. There are a substantial number of what 
were likely to be careless mistakes, including one case of an omission of a 
bloc of 18 characters. As a result, as shown in Chart below, among the five 
texts now available, the one that is apparently furthest from the original 
text of “Chao-xian Ce-lue” is Text E, “Japan’s diplomatic records” version. 
To take as an example the case of the thirteenth phrase listed in Table 
above, the same wording of “??????” is found in Text A (p.160, line 6) 
and in Text B, while in Text C, which is considered to have been derived 
from either Text A or B, the phrase was rewritten “??????” with a 
mistake. In Text E, which is considered to have belonged to a line different 
from Text C, the phrase was or had been erroneously transcribed as “???
???.” The producer of Text D, who apparently judged the wording in Text 
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E to be erroneous, changed it to “??????,” but not thoroughly25). In 
the following discussion of the contents of “Chao-xian Ce-lue,” we shall take 
all these differences among the texts into consideration. 
 
 
Chart   Lines of Different Texts of Huang Zun-xian’s “Chao-xian Ce-lue” 
 
 
 
II. Policy Recommendations 
 
1. Huang’s Recognition of the Contemporary International Situation – 
Wariness toward Russia 
 
For the purpose of exemplifying differences between the five texts, the first 
paragraph of “Chao-xian Ce-lue” was used above. The cited paragraph 
began with the statement, “On the Earth, there is a gigantic state and it is 
called Russia.” Then, it pointed out that though Russia had been seeking 
territorial expansion for years, its empire building westward had been 
contained by wariness toward it by the European powers, including 
Germany, Austria, Britain, Italy and France (the order of the states is 
according to that in Texts A and B). As a result, it had changed its course 
eastward, and had already occupied Sakhalin, the east bank of Heilong 
Jiang river and the mouth of Tumen river. Now, Russia was trying to rule 
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these newly acquired areas with the utmost effort. “Chao-xian Ce-lue” 
concluded that Russia was doing so, “solely because the country wishes to 
materialize its ambition in Asia.”  
     Huang Zun-xian began his policy statement, which was to recommend 
a drastic turnaround of Korea’s diplomacy and domestic administration, 
abruptly with the statement: “On the earth, there is a gigantic state and it 
is called Russia.” We can say that this was indeed a decisive recognition of 
the international situation then. We can also say that it was a clear 
presentation of the theme, as this recognition was made a consistent basis 
for his policy recommendations that followed. It has been an accepted way 
to say that China under the reign of the Qing dynasty was wary of Russia 
because China had been threatened by Russia approaching China’s 
northern territory. However, Huang’s scope of vision reached as far as 
Europe, and took the European powers’ alliance against Russia as a crucial 
point. This shows that Huang Zun-xian, a young Chinese diplomat, had a 
penetrating recognition of the contemporary situation. 
 
2. Policy for Korea – “Keeping Close to China, Creating Ties with Japan, 
and Allying with the United States” and “Aiming Only to Strengthen Itself” 
 
In the paragraph that followed, Huang Zun-xian pointed to the geopolitical 
importance of Korea in international politics in Asia, and presented a basic 
policy to be taken by Korea as follows: 
 
? ????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
???????????? 26) 
The land of Korea is located at a pivot in Asia indeed, and will never 
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fail to provide a contesting ground. If Korea falls into crisis, the 
situation in China and Japan will swiftly change as well. If Russia 
wants to expand its territory, it will certainly start from Korea. Alas, 
Russia has been making strenuous efforts for expansion for the past 
three hundreds years or more, watching to pounce like a wolf as was the 
ancient Qin. Its invasion first targeted Europe, then Central Asia, and 
now Russia is targeting East Asia. Thus, Korea is very likely to be the 
immediate victim of Russia. Therefore, no other task is more urgent for 
Korea than to defend against a possible Russian invasion. What will be 
the measure for defense against Russia? We say the only way for Korea 
is to remain close to China, create ties with Japan, ally itself with the 
United States, and try to strengthen itself. 
 
Note: Collation of Differences among the Texts 
 (In the original Chinese text of this paragraph, the following differences 
of wordings are found and collated among the five texts.) 
   “???????”?Texts A, B, D and E?? “??????”?Text C? 
   “????”?Texts A, B, D and E?? “????”?Text C? 
   “??????”?Texts A, B and C?? “?????”?Texts D and E? 
   “??????”?Text B?? “?????”?Text A?? “?????”?Texts   
      C, D and E? 
   “????” (Texts A, B and D)? “?????” (Text C)? “???” (Text   
      E) 
   “??????” (Texts A, B, D and E)? “??????” (Text C) 
?  “???????” (Texts A, B, D and E)? “???????” (Text C) 27) 
 
Huang repeatedly pointed out that Russia had tried to expand its territory 
into Europe and then into Central Asia, and now that it was targeting East 
Asia. He further argued that since Korea was a pivot in Asia, it would 
inevitably become an area of conflict, and that it thus had no other urgent 
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task than defending itself against Russia. And then, for Korea’s policy 
toward Russia he made the famous foreign policy recommendation: “Keep 
close to China, Create ties with Japan, and Ally with the United States of 
America” and the domestic policy recommendation: “Aim to strengthen 
itself.” 
 
3. Korea’s Policy toward Japan 
 
Huang Zun-xian anticipated that there would be doubt from the Korean 
side about the three pillars of his recommendations. Thus, he stated: 
 
??????????????????????????????????
??????????? 28) 
Now, to keep close to China is what Korea believes in. As for tying with 
Japan, it half believes and half doubts. And to ally with the United 
States is what Korea deeply doubts. 
 
Assuming these doubts and by way of answering them, Huang gave a full 
account of the validity of his recommended policy. Here, let us take his 
recommended policy toward Japan, namely, “creating ties with Japan,” as 
an example. The primary reason for recommending that Korea create ties 
with Japan was that, except for China, Japan had the closest relations with 
Korea. The two countries shared the threat of Russia in the north, and if 
Korea were to suffer any mishap, Japan would be unable to retain the 
islands of Kyushu and Shikoku either. “Therefore, Japan and Korea are 
mutually dependent just as a wheel and its axle.” Under the encroachment 
of the Western powers, Japan was hopeful to form an “association as close 
as the lips and the teeth” with Korea. So, Huang recommended that Korea 
discard its petty Japanophobia and take a far-sighted policy of creating ties 
with Japan29). 
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However, anti-Japanese forces in Korea would cite Hideyoshi’s 
invasion of Korea in the past and the Kangwhado Incident in more recent 
times to justify their distrust of Japan. Regarding this anti-Japanese 
sentiment, Huang Zun-xian pointed out that Korea was resilient enough in 
that although it had been temporarily subdued by invasions of foreign 
forces in the past, it had never allowed them complete domination. He then 
tried to mitigate Korean suspicion of a possible Japanese invasion, by 
saying that China’s involvement in Korean affairs would certainly thwart 
any Japanese intention to make inroads into Korea. Regarding the role of 
China in discouraging such attempts, Huang mentioned that Li 
Hong-zhang’s recent warning to Japan had been effective. He asserted that 
because of China’s presence in Korea, Saigo Takamori's proposal to invade 
Korea had not been implemented after all30).  
Also, if the Japanese side became convinced of a close “lips and teeth” 
relationship with Korea, it would seek, as a matter of course, trust and 
friendship. Moreover, if it became aware of the currents of the times, Japan 
would understand that it would be in its own interest to have “Korea 
strengthen itself to serve as a wall of defense in the west of the sea.” Still 
more, he continued, while appearing strong, in reality Japan at present “is 
internally dried out, with the government having lost touch with its people 
and the National Treasury being hollowed out,” so that it would have no 
room for attempting an invasion of Korea. He said that as it was important 
to know oneself and to know the other, Korea should know that just as 
there was no doubt in the certainty of Japan wanting to tie up with Korea, 
there was no doubt about the inevitability of Korea entering into a 
partnership with Japan31). 
In addition, Huang Zun-xian took note of a Korean suspicion that 
mapping surveys conducted by Japan on the Korean coasts might indicate 
an intention to invade Korea, and assured that such suspicions were 
anachronistic, because in contemporary times, when nations visited each 
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other, it was natural to make maps of their countries open to others. Also, 
to opposing arguments that the Japanese were violent and intimidating 
Korea, and that “the personality of the Japanese is such that they favor 
victory and do not concede; are greedy and shameless; and look only at 
minor matters and do not see far,” Huang advised that in both countries 
the poor and the villainous might show such shortcomings, but the 
Japanese government did not have such bad intentions, so all that Korea 
must do was to observe treaties and act according to reason. In short, by 
arguing that if Korea stuck to its traditional way of thinking and did not 
discard obsolete ideas, it would lose chances to adopt the best policy, Huang 
tried to persuade the Korean government to adopt a new policy toward 
Japan32). 
In the later part of this paper, we will touch upon the characteristics of 
Huang Zun-xian’s recommendations for Korea’s policy toward Japan such 
as we have just seen, and point out that there were certain biases in them. 
 
III. Learning the Principles of Modern International Politics 
 
1. Exposure to the Principles of Modern International Politics 
 
As we saw, Huang Zun-xian proposed to Korea the foreign policy of 
“keeping close with China, creating ties with Japan and allying with the 
United States,” and the domestic policy of “aiming to strengthen itself.” It 
is on the basis of a sense of wariness toward Russia that he made this 
proposal and especially because he had a unique view of Russia that had as 
wide a scope as covered whole Eurasia. However, this kind of view alone, 
far-sighted as it might have been, would not have produced a policy 
recommendation that included a possible Korean alliance with the United 
States. There is enough reason to believe that there was an important 
sufficient condition. After repeatedly pointing to the threat of Russia, 
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Huang enumerated the reasons why he recommended for Korea to make 
Japan and the United States its allies. More precisely, he tried to convince 
Korean people that there was little ground for their fear of Japan and the 
United States. Then, perhaps because he sensed that his reasoning was not 
convincing enough, he introduced a theory of international politics. In his 
argument to anticipated doubts regarding the proposal of “allying with the 
United States,” he emphasized that the United States had a vast national 
territory and abundant resources, so that the world knew well that it would 
not invade other countries. Then, immediately, he added the following 
explanation: 
 
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????? 33)  
And why do Britain, France, Germany and Italy, looking to each other, 
come to Korea one after another and ask for alliance?? Because that is 
what the West calls the theorem of balance of power. Today in the world, 
all states compete and struggle in all possible combinations, to a greater 
degree than in the times of the Warring States. And, if the great powers 
want to form a stellar constellation in order to keep a state of peace, it is 
possible only when they have a condition in which neither very weak nor 
very strong states exist so that they can maintain each other. If there is 
even one state that annexes other states, it increases its power and if it 
increases its power, it increases its military strength, which in turn 
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threatens the security of all the other states. In whole Europe, powers in 
rivalry watch closely for an opportunity, so it is already impossible for 
any to make inroads into other countries. Accordingly, the great powers 
seek opportunities towards the East. Looking towards the East, they 
know they should first focus on Korea. If Russia ever occupies Korea, 
then all that is required is its will to gain a firm grasp of the whole of 
Asia. And, if Russia, with the whole of Asia under its reign, turns around 
and attacks Europe, its force will hardly be resisted. The public law of 
the West does not allow any state to annihilate another. However, unless 
a country is signatory, it cannot be included in the system even when it 
is in danger of annihilation. This is why the Western states wish to form 
alliances with Korea. They wish to form alliances with Korea because 
they want to prevent Russia from monopolizing Korea and to maintain 
Korea in balance together with the other powers in the world. To 
maintain Korea means for them to maintain themselves. It is not the 
United States alone who sees such self-interest in an alliance with 
Korea. 
 
As seen above, Huang Zun-xian’s basis of argument was the theorem of 
balance of power that prevailed in the West at the time. His image of the 
balance of power was something like a “stellar constellation among the 
great powers” 34), namely, none other than a chandelier-shaped balance of 
power or that of mobile type which lacked a balancer. Huang argued that it 
was on the basis of this theorem that the United States, together with 
Britain, France, Germany and Italy, came to Korea seeking an alliance. It 
was certain, he reiterated, that the powers of the West were seeking to 
conclude friendship treaties with Korea out of self-interest. However, their 
self-interest was not to invade Korea, as Koreans were fearful, but to 
protect themselves by preventing Russia from gaining power. He stressed 
that they wished exactly for the independence and autonomy of Korea. He 
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also emphasized that “in the customs of the West, when two states are in 
the state of war, [other states which are] neutral between them cannot take 
a side”? “????????????????????????”? 35); therefore, 
in order to stand up against Russia, Korea had no choice but to ally with 
the powers of the West. 
     Most likely for a young diplomat as he was at the time, Huang was 
learning principles of international politics, which were new and 
particularly novel for China, and he made them the theoretical basis for his 
policy recommendation. Where did Huang learn this modern theory of 
international politics? Minister He seemingly did not have that much 
knowledge. Also, it is unlikely that any book that would provide 
commentary on the theory of international politics was available in Japan 
at that time. It is probable that he acquired this knowledge through 
conversations with his Japanese friends. Among those Japanese who 
visited the Qing Consulate at the time were Ito Hirobumi (Councilor of 
State), Enomoto Takeaki (Lord of the Navy), Ooyama Iwao (Lord of the 
Army) and others36). Also, the Qing legation headed by He, during its first 
period, carried out tough negotiations with Terashima Munenori (Lord of 
Foreign Affairs) on the Ryukyu issue. Further, it was reported that Harry 
Parkes, the British Minister stationed in Japan, visited He and advised 
him that China should recommend that Korea conclude relations of 
friendship with many other states37). It is unlikely, however, that Huang 
associated with those figures of higher ranks personally and learnt the 
theory of international politics from them. Rather, it can be reasonably 
assumed that in his conversations with such Japanese amateur literary 
figures as Ishikawa, Okochi and Miyajima who frequented the legation, 
topics related to the understanding of international politics were included. 
 
2. Chinese-style Application  
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We have several earlier studies pointing to the fact that the policy the 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue” recommended to Korea was in the line of Qing dynasty’s 
Korean policy and its Asian policy38). Li Hong-zhang and He Ru-zhang 
agreed and were consistent on the policy of retaining Korea under the 
control of China by any means (“to maintain Korea first”), in the face of the 
radically changing international situation. In such a concerted effort by Li 
and He, however, there were differences in thinking between the two. 
Regarding the differences between them, Motegi Toshio says that while Li 
“retained the framework of traditional relationship of suzerainty [over 
Korea],” He began asserting, beginning in November 1880, the need “to 
convert Korea into 'a dependent state' in terms of modern international 
law."39) Harada Tamaki argues that while “Li Hong-zhang’s policy was 
based on traditional Chinese diplomatic doctrine, “the Chao-xian Ce-lue” 
presented some influence of the prevailing European diplomatic theory.” 40) 
It is this paper’s argument that such differences and causes behind the 
changes can be attributed to Huang Zun-xian’s study of the modern theory 
of international politics. The question then is whether Huang’s 
understanding was in perfect accordance with the “modern theory of 
international politics”.  
According to his understanding, the practice of “balance of power” in 
the world then was equivalent to “all states competing and struggling in all 
possible combinations”, and indeed that proclivity was much more intense 
than in the times of the Warring States in China. Clearly, his reference was 
to the ancient Chinese “inter-state” politics. Then, we have enough reason 
to assume that his understanding of the “stellar constellation formed by the 
great powers” was in the same vein, also being based on his reference to 
the era of Warring States. In his argument advising Korea to work together 
with Japan to counterbalance Russia, Huang took precedents from Chinese 
historical cases where “Han, Zhao and Wei in alliance thwarted Qin’s 
intention to advance eastward, and Wu and Shu in alliance discouraged 
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Wei’s intention to invade the south.” 41)   
What was characteristic above all was the basis he took for his 
argument recommending that Korea pursue a policy of “keeping close with 
China.” In short, the policy was a mixture of the traditional China-Korea 
relationship of “[the small] submitting to the big while [the big] protecting 
the small” (c. “shida zixiao”; j. “jidai jisho”; k. “sadae jaso”) and the modern 
international relationship of protectorate and protected 42). In other words, 
what he advised Korea to do was to conclude treaties with anti-Russian 
powers, including Japan and the United States, but not to become 
independent as a sovereign state.  Indeed, he noted the fact that smaller 
states were surviving in European international politics, but he called 
attention to that fact only to emphasize the effects of balance of power.     
Certainly, “Chao-xian Ce-lue” was a part of “Qing’s international 
strategy.” 43)  Here, however, China had a dilemma; “if Korea concludes 
treaties with other states and is recognized internationally as an 
independent state, Korea will no longer be a dependent state of China and 
China will lose Korea accordingly.” 44) It has to be noted that either Huang 
did not sense this dilemma even by his new learning, or he intentionally 
neglected it.  Instead, he maintained that it was in Korea's best interest to 
remain a dependent state of China, stating for instance that “since 
dependent states are excepted from this rule, Korea today ought to follow 
China ever more closely than before.”? “????????????????
???????”?45) 
 
3. Policy Recommendations to Korea 
 
As has been discussed above, Huang Zun-xian’s recognition of Korea’s 
prospects within international politics was such a stern one that Korea as a 
smaller state had to work to survive by any means. One of the ways to 
sustain itself was, as we have seen, to be dependent on China’s protection, 
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and the other was to strengthen itself. “As a basis for strengthening itself,” 
Huang mentioned five measures, namely, to exchange diplomatic envoys 
with China, Japan and the United States; to expand trade with China; to 
let Korean businessmen learn trade practices in Nagasaki and Yokohama; 
to make the Korean army and navy forces use Qing’s dragon flag; and, to 
learn Western science and technology and from Qing and Japan46). For the 
fifth measure, he gave praise to Japan, saying, “Korean officers must go to 
Japan to learn about dockyards, gun factories, military barracks and all 
sorts of things.” Huang’s concept of “strengthening itself” in this context 
was to fortify national power in terms of diplomacy, international trade and 
military affairs, rather than more broadly defined strengthening of 
national power by the “encouragement of new industries” or the 
accomplishment of so-called “modernization.” Nevertheless, his view of 
Japan that emerged from the whole of “Chao-xian Ce-lue” was an appraisal 
of the rapid “modernization” of Japan in the Meiji era, and it can 
reasonably be said that Huang saw Japan as the model for “Korea’s 
strengthening itself.”  
On the other hand, “Korea’s strengthening itself” was not to be 
pursued by Korea independently of China. This attitude of Huang’s was 
characteristically shown in his advice to the Korean army and navy forces 
to request the use of Qing’s dragon flag. His attitude was indeed that of a 
guardian, advising Korea to send students to the School of Translation in 
Peking for learning Western languages, to Zhili Province for military drills, 
to Shanghai Arsenal for learning production of machinery and to Fuzhou 
Dockyard for learning shipbuilding. The entire “Chao-xian Ce-lue” was 
filled with this attitude. 
 
IV. The Interactions of Three Cultures 
 
1. The World of Chinese Writing and the World of Transcription 
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Now, if we place the document called “Chao-xian Ce-lue” in the context of 
the East Asian world of 1880, we realize afresh the basic fact that, 
accompanying the international movement of a figure named Kim Hong-Jip, 
one document moved across borders. Further, prior to these movements, a 
figure named Huang Zun-xian moved internationally. And in that 
environment, where different cultures contacted each other and efforts 
were made to explore different cultures, a diplomatic document such as 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue” was produced. Of course, a few people who moved 
across borders those days were limited to high-level government officials, 
and the documents that moved were very special. These movements in the 
1880s were not comparable to the bustling international movements of 
persons and cultural elements from the latter half of the 20th century to 
the present. Nevertheless, in the East Asian world in the late 19th century, 
such movements did occur, producing intense developments in 
international and domestic politics. 
The East Asian world in the latter half of the 19th century was a 
world dominated by Chinese writing. In those years, as far as reading and 
writing were concerned, the written Chinese was the “lingua franca” of the 
East Asian sphere. The peoples who used Chinese, Korean or Japanese in 
their everyday life were able to communicate with each other in the 
international scene, by employing Chinese writing as an official language47). 
We should also remember that the culture of printed media had not yet 
emerged, and transcription was the norm48). Thus, documents came and 
went across borders of the three countries and in the course of such 
movements, they were transcribed reiteratively, resulting in many 
variorums. 
The collation of five different texts attempted in this paper ended in 
an unsatisfactory result. Several transcription errors were discovered, and 
it has been possible to establish to some extent the relationship between 
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the texts. Nevertheless, the original text has not been identified nor 
recomposed. In the first place, however, it can be suspected that the 
original text drafted by Huang Zun-xian himself contained some writing 
errors, so that even if all the transcript errors could be corrected, the 
corrected text should not be regarded as a substitution for the original text 
that must have existed. Rather, in this context, it seems meaningful for us 
to confirm the fact that in the East Asian sphere at that time, several 
different texts of the same work were circulating across national borders49). 
Incidentally, from the different texts produced by transcribing works, 
some slight differences in writing expression, which are attributable to 
national culture, can be identified. Namely, in documents presumably 
transcribed in Korea, there is a tendency to frequently use the Chinese 
character “? ” and another tendency for the transcribed sentences to 
become slightly “flappy.” According to the author’s little knowledge of 
Chinese writing practiced in Korea, these tendencies can be attributed to 
linguistic interference by the Korean language. Thus, it is apparent that 
Text C passed through Korean society. On the other hand, Chinese writing 
by Japanese seemingly had a habit to use “?” in place of the “?” used in 
Chinese writing by Chinese. By looking at these two Chinese characters, 
i.e., “?” and “?”, it can be confirmed that Text E and Text D came back to 
Japan after being circulated in Korea. 
 
2. The Influence of Japanese Culture 
 
Huang Zun-xian wrote “Chao-xian Ce-lue” with the stance of concentrating 
on diplomatic and military aspects50). It should be noted also that he wrote 
the work in Japan during the fourth year of his stay there. When he tried 
to propose a new initiative on one of the biggest diplomatic issues facing 
the Chinese government, Huang conjured up a Japan that had been 
hustling into “modernization” and therefore provided a model for “Korea to 
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strengthen itself,” even though it had begun to face problems involved in 
the modernizing process. On such an occasion, his earlier image of an ideal 
Japan, where a quiet-mannered people lived in peace, disappeared. In place 
of this ideal Japan emerged a stout state that was building up military 
strength and economic power to survive in the arena of international 
politics. In the Japanese society where he found himself, the threat of 
Russia was a common topics and the theory of balance of power was a 
common knowledge51). It is likely that “Chao-xian Ce-lue,” which was 
hastily written in such an intellectual atmosphere, was substantially 
influenced by Japanese culture. 
As a matter of fact, Huang Zun-xian’s proposal for Korea’s Japan 
policy merely asked the Korean government to tie up with Japan, lacking 
specific contents. His recommendation was too much focused on 
confrontation with Russia to take into consideration the possible 
consequences for Korea of the “tying with Japan” policy. He laid aside the 
Ryukyu issue, the largest pending issue in China’s diplomatic policy toward 
Japan, and Japan’s policy on this issue as well52). He also disregarded the 
magnitude for Korea of the possibility of Japan’s invading Korea. His favor 
toward Japanese culture, as expounded in his “Poems on Japanese 
Miscellany,” seemed to disappear tentatively, but his favoritism toward 
Japan cast its shadow on the whole “Chao-xian Ce-lue,” helping to produce 
a policy recommendation very favorable for Japan. He “knowingly” pointed 
out problems implicit in Japanese society at the time and severely 
criticized Japan, but, in reality, under the effect of his Japanese 
environment, Huang was not able to gain insights into the direction of 
Japan’s policy toward Korea. He was probably caught in the pitfall that 
"Japan hands" tend to fall into. 
 
3. Effects of Chinese Culture 
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Needless to say, Huang Zun-xian’s “Chao-xian Ce-lue” was filled with the 
effects of Chinese culture. Here, let me add two points of particular interest. 
First, an anticipated question he set was: If Korea established diplomatic 
relations with big countries in the West, Korea, as a smaller country, might 
not be able to endure the burden of providing diplomatic entertainment 
and protocol for their diplomatic missions. In his planned answer, he again 
“knowingly” stated that it was an unnecessary concern and admonished for 
Koreans the protocol of modern diplomacy in detail. By pretending that the 
question was that of ceremony and was nearly the same as that of the 
traditional diplomatic protocol between China and Japan, he avoided facing 
the true question. 
Second, the “theorem of balance of power,” which was the primary 
foundation of the argument in “Chao-xian Ce-lue,” was quite likely 
regarded as equivalent to the “using barbarians to control barbarians 
theory” in traditional Chinese culture and it was almost instinctively used 
to persuade Korea. In this regard it seems possible to interpret that the 
whole of “Chao-xian Ce-lue” was a product of the effects of Chinese 
culture53). However, on this particular point, there is a major difference. 
The method of “using barbarians to control barbarians” was basically a 
method by which the principal actor (in most cases, China) manipulated 
one “barbarian” against another, whereas the policy of collective security 
and alliance in the modern international politics, as proposed by Huang, 
had a pattern where all other states had to form an alliance to control one 
single state (in this case, Russia). Little wonder, Korean people concluded 
that Russia was such an overwhelming superpower. 
 
4. Resistance by Korean Culture 
 
Huang Zun-xian fully anticipated Korean resistance to the policy proposal 
in “Chao-xian Ce-lue.” In fact, the entire work can be seen as a prepared 
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argument to overcome the resistance he anticipated. The anticipated 
resistance originated from Korean culture in general, rather than in 
opposition to his particular policy recommendations. It was already pointed 
out above that Huang had anticipated Korean reluctance to open the 
country because of the burden of entertaining foreign diplomatic missions 
from the West. He also tried to overcome the anticipated Korean attitude of 
non-commercialism, which can be classed into a resistance originating from 
Korean culture. The corner stone of the policy he recommended for Korea, 
that is, the policy of “keeping close with China, creating ties with Japan 
and allying with the United States”, was really a tough one, consisting of 
two concepts that straddled across two different international systems. 
Should any state, be it Korea or China itself, have accepted it, that state 
was prone to be split into two separate systems. It is conceivable, however, 
that Huang bet on his hope of Korea’s accepting this almost inconceivable 
policy on its culture that had been accustomed to the “keeping close with 
China” for long.  
Korean culture, however, adopted a far more fundamental resistance 
that went beyond Huang’s expectations. “Chao-xian Ce-lue,” which was 
circulated under the order of King Kojong for the purpose of adopting the 
open-door and civilization policy, was transcribed by Confucian scholars of 
opposition camps throughout the country, was circulated for reading, and 
provoked severe criticism against the new policy initiative and backlashes 
against Kim Hong-Jip and Huang Zun-xian (and against China)54). The 
Confucian scholars became much more confident in forging Korea into a 
nation more loyal to Confucian teaching than China under the reign of the 
Qing dynasty, and took the firm attitude of not hesitating to choose an 
honorable death as a small nation that respected Confucius. From then on, 
the ideas of the Korean people were split into two antagonistic camps – the 
camp of peace and friendship with foreigners and civilization, and the 
anti-foreign, conservative camp. 
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Closing Remarks – the Significance of “Chao-xian Ce-lue”  
 
All the researchers specialized in this particular area are unified in 
pointing out that  “Chao-xian Ce-lue” was an epoch-making event, which 
caused a major turnaround not only in Korean domestic and foreign 
policies but also in the international politics of Northeast Asia. The Korean 
court shifted to a civilization and open-the-country policy, overriding 
fundamental and deep-seated opposition. In the international politics of 
Northeast Asia, the rivalries among China, Japan and Russia became 
increasingly open, which later provoked a renewed advance of the Western 
powers into this region. In the end, the international rivalries in the region 
headed toward different directions from those suggested by “Chao-xian 
Ce-lue,” and particularly for Korea toward a tragic direction. 
On the other hand, more than a few developments coincided with 
those depicted in “Chao-xian Ce-lue.” The meaning of “strengthening itself” 
was clarified for Korea55). Northeast Asia became a major theater of 
international politics where China, Japan, the United States and Russia 
confronted one another. However, neither China nor Japan nor the United 
States took the actions predicted by Huang. All of them betrayed Korea, 
and in particular the betrayal committed by China was especially 
substantial. Surely, in the instance of the 1882 mutiny (“Imo Sabyeon”), 
China tried to protect Korea, but in subsequent years, it never adopted the 
role of a protectorate state. After it once tilted toward Russia tentatively, 
Korea moved through a history of hardship under the rule of Japan. 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue,” which became the watershed in this history, was 
written down by a Chinese cultural leader within the environment of 
Japanese culture. 
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recent studies, it seems not possible to regard it as his original completely. 
The fact that its author part was written as “Privately drafted by Huang 
Zun-xian of Guangdong” is not considered to be a sufficient basis for 
Kamachi’s argument. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the work seems to 
have reflected Huang’s own ideas abundantly, although quite likely he 
drafted it in compliance with the thinking of He Ru-zhang and others. 
9) Ha, op.cit., p.189. 
10) “Sushinsa Ilgi” Vol. 2 (“Choson Chaengnyak”) in the Korean Committee 
for Editing the National History , ed., Han’gok saryo ch’ongso (Materials 
for Korean History) , Volume 9 (Sushinsa Kirok ), Seoul, 1958, pp.160-171. 
11) Harada Tamaki, Chosen no Kaikoku to Kindaika (Korea’s Open-door and 
Modernization), Keisuisha, Hiroshima,1999, for example, says in note 1 on 
p.265, “There are several different texts of “Chao-xian Ce-lue”, but as a 
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temporary measue, this book refers to the text found in the collection 
compiled by the Korean Committee for Editing the National History.” 
12) “Choson Chaengnyak” in “Sushinsa Ilgi”, Korea University’s Central 
Library, ed. Kim Hong-Jip Yugo (Manuscripts left by Kim Hong-Jip), Korea 
University Press, 1976, pp.306-313. 
13) “Choson Chaengnyak”, Huang Zun-xian (original author), Cho Il-Mun, tr. 
and annotated, Choson Chaengnyak, Konkuk University Press, pp.109-120. 
14) “Chosen Sakuryaku”, (Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, comp., Nihon 
Gaiko Monjo (Diplomatic documents of Japan), vol. 13 (the 13th year of 
Meiji), Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyokai, Tokyo, 1950, pp.389-394 (Document 
no.136). 
15) “Chosen Sakuryaku” owned by Nakamura Shojiro (Chinese classics 
section, Library of the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, no.L17 4700). 
In 1985, in the seminar class on the history of East Asian international 
relations conducted by the author at the Department of International 
Relations, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo, 
Komaba, attempts were made to read, translate and interpret “Chao-xian 
Ce-lue”, but only up to the first one-fifth. Students participating were 
Zhang Qi-xiong (now of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 
Taipei), Sunayama Yukio (now at Aichi University), Tsuchida Akio (now at 
Chuo University), Kawashima Midori (now at Jochi University), Tomosue 
Mariko (now at the University of Tokyo, Komaba), Takita Sachiko (now at 
Yokohama City University), and the late Fujita Yuji. It is Mr. Zhang 
Qi-xiong who located this particular text formerly owned by Mr. Nakamura. 
The author’s special thanks go to these former students of mine. For 
without this discovery and their joint efforts to read the documents 
seventeen years ago, the original Japanese article would have never been 
written in 2002. 
16) However, collations with the other texts reveal that the Nakamura text 
is neither immune to omissions of words. Therefore, this number does not 
necessarily correspond to the total number of words in the original text. 
17) A mark / is inserted where indentation is made. 
18) Of course, all the quotations from “Chao-xian Ce-lue” below are made 
from my collated text, but to provide a clue to the text, these first sentences 
can be found on p.160 of Han’gok Saryo Ch’ongso (Materials for Korean 
History), vol.9 (See note 10 above). 
19) In identifying differences of wordings among the texts, the following 
rules are adopted: 1) simplified characters are considered equal to correct 
characters; 2) characters written in different ways are regarded as the 
same; 3) characters written in idiosyncratic ways by certain transcribers 
are considered equal to normal characters; 4) certain two characters are 
regarded as equal; and 5) certain two characters are regarded as different 
from each other. 
20) It does not seem that the punctuation marks added on Text A are all 
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correct. But if we use them consistently as the basis for counting the 
numbers of phrases, there will be no damage to the comparative counting 
we are going to make below. 
21) As for the foundation of methods of collation, see Ikeda Kikan, Koten no 
Hihan-teki Shochi ni kansuru Kenkyu (A Study for Critical Approaches to 
Classic Literature), Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1941, Part II, ch.1. 
22) They are not completely identical, however. On Text E, there is no 
addition of “a native of Gaungdong, while a different hand has added 
“’can-zan’ of the Qing” to it. 
23) (Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., p.389. 
24) Kaisei Kanin-roku, Zen (Government Official Registry, Complete and 
Revised), October, the 13th year of Meiji, June, the 14th year of Meiji and 
February, the 15th year of Meiji. The Meiji 14th and 15th versions give 
“Nakamura Shotaro”, but these are clearly mistakes for “Nakamura 
Shojiro”. (Japan) Library of Diplomatic Records kindly provided the 
following information: Nakamura Shojiro, a native of Nagasaki prefecture, 
was born in 1855 and employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1875. 
He started working as a charge d’affaires for the Consulate in Wonsan in 
March, 1880, and had been stationed there until he was transferred to the 
Consulate in Inchon in April, 1894. 
25) See entry no.13 of Table above. 
26) For instance, see Han’gok Saryo Ch’ongso, p.160, l.7 - p.161, l.1. 
27) This note is to provide a sample of my text collation. Phrases on the left 
are selected and others to the right are not. To obviate the tedium, 
collations will not be shown from the next quotation on. 
28) For instance, see Ibid., p.162, ll.9-10. 
29) For instance, see Ibid., p.161, ll.11-14. 
30) For instance, see Ibid., p.162, l.15 – p.163, l.6.  
31) For instance, see Ibid., p.162, l.15 - p.163, l.6.  
32) For instance, see Ibid., p.163, l.7 - p.164, l.8.  
33) For instance, see Ibid., p.164, l.14 - p.165, l.5. Again, this is a result of 
my collation with the other four texts.  
34) The original Chinese expression for this is “????” in Texts A and B, 
“????” in Text C, and “????” in Text E.  
35) For instance, see Ibid., p.161, ll.7-8.  
36) Zhang, op.cit., p.190 and Saneto and Toyoda, op.cit., p.300.  
37) Zhang, op.cit., p.140, based on Yu Zheng, He Ru-zhang zhuan (Biography 
of He Ru-zhang), Nanking University Press, 1991, p.3. Harada Tamaki, 
“Shin ni okeru Chosen no Kaikoku Kindaika-ron: ‘Chosen Sakuryaku’ to 
‘Shuji Chosen Gaiko-gi’” (Qing Arguments for Korea’s Open-door and 
Modernization: “Chao-xian Ce-lue” and ‘Discussions on Diplomacy to 
Maintain Korea First’), Chapter 9 of Harada, Chosen no Kaikoku to 
Kindaika (Korea’s Open-door and Modernization), Keisuisha, 
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Hiroshima,1999 gives a most extensive analysis of “Chao-xian Ce-lue” and 
maintains that it contains Terashima Munenori’s influence in its analysis 
of international affairs (p.249).  
38) Suzuki Tomoo, “Chugoku ni okeru Kokken-shugi-teki Gaiko-ron no 
Seiritsu: Shodai Chu-Nichi Koshi Ka Jo-sho no Katsudo o chushin-ni” (The 
Establishment of a Sovereignty Diplomacy in China: Focusing the 
Activities of He Ru-zhang, the First Envoy to Japan), Rekishigaku Kenkyu 
(Historical Studies), no.404 (1974), pp.20-34, Harada Tamaki, “’Chosen 
Sakuryaku’ o megutte: Ri Ko-sho to Ka Jo-sho no Chosen Seisaku” (On 
“Chao-xian Ce-lue”: Korean Policy of Li Hong-zhang and He Ru-zhang), 
Kyegan Samchonni (Samchonni Quarterly), no.17 (February, 1979), 
pp.202-206, Harada Tamaki, “1880-nendai Zenhan no Min-shi Seiken to 
Kin In-shoku: Taigai Seisaku o chushin-ni” (The Min Government and Kim 
Yun-Shik in the early 1880’s: Focusing on Foreign Policy), Chosen-shi 
Kenkyukai Ronbun-shu (Papers from the Study Group of Korean History), 
no.22 (1987), Motegi Toshio, “Ri Ko-sho no Zokkoku Shihai-kan” (Li 
Hong-zhang’s Concepts of Control over Tributary States), Chugoku – 
Shakai to Bunka (China: Society and Culture), no.2 (1987), Motegi Toshio, 
“Chuka Sekai no ‘Kindai-teki’ Henyo: Shin-matsu no Henkyo Shihai” 
(Modern Transformation of the Traditional Chinese World: Border Control 
in Late Qing), Chiiki Sisutemu (Regional Systems), University of Tokyo 
Press, 1993, pp.269-299.  
39) Motegi, “Ri Ko-sho no Zokkoku Shihai-kan” (op.cit.), p.101.  
40) Harada, “’Chosen Sakuryaku’ o megutte” (op.cit.), p.205.  
41) For instance, see Han’gok Saryo Ch’ongso, p.161, l.13.  
42) For example, “China loves Korea more than any other country. It has 
been over one thousand years since Korea became tributary to China, 
throughout which period China has secured it with virtues and attached it 
to her with benevolence, never intending to be greedy for its land and 
people.” (For instance, see Han’gok Saryo Ch’ongso, p.161, ll.3-4.) “China, if 
ever an incident took place in Korea, exhausted resources of the whole 
country and tried every means in its power to protect it.” (Ibid., p.161, l.7.) 
“Needless to say, if ever Japan would take an advantage over Korea, China 
would naturally come to contend against her.” (Ibid., p.163, l.1.)  
43) Harada, Chosen no Kaikoku to Kindaika, p.25.  
44) Harada, “’Chosen Sakuryaku’ o megutte”, p.205.  
45) For instance, see Han’gok Saryo Ch’ongso, p.161, l.8. Here, “the rule” 
referred to other states’ neutrality in the case of war between two 
non-signatory states. See footnote 34. 
46) For instance, see Ibid., p.167, ll.8 – 13. 
47) In the latter half of the twentieth century, peoples in East Asia, where 
international relations have been popularized, are divided into the 
speakers of Chinese, Korean and Japanese and are forced to employ 
English as the means of international communication. To be superfluous, I 
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would like to point out that the current situation is similar to that of the 
nineteenth century East Asia. 
48) My exposure to historical materials makes me think that the 
Russo-Japanese war was the diverging point from transcribed materials to 
printed materials. To put it in short, ability to read hand-written materials 
is by all means indispensable for historical research on periods prior to the 
Russo-Japanese war but not always so for periods after it. 
49) In such a context, Text D, namely the text in the Japanese diplomatic 
records, is the least accurate, although it is regarded as the furthest away 
from the original document. It is regrettable that little attention was paid 
to the meanings of the “Chao-xian Ce-lue” and the history that the 
document had been drafted in Japan and returned home to Japan. 
50) I agree to Tabohashi Kiyoshi’s critique of “Chao-xian Ce-lue” that it 
contained only “plain diplomatic discussions” and not significant political 
discourses (Tabohashi, op.cit., p.745). 
51) Ho Takushu, Meiji Shoki Ni-Kkan-Shin Kankei no Kenkyu (A Study of 
Relations among Japan, Korea and China during the Early Meiji Period) 
(Hanawa Shobo, Tokyo, 1969) concludes that Huang’s assertion of Russian 
threat was much influenced by the Japanese argument (p.90). 
52) Kamachi, op.cit., points out that Huang Zun-xian at that time was 
doubtlessly concerned with the fate of the Ryukyu (p.112). He must have 
viewed the fate of small country Korea being overlapped by that of the 
Ryukyu islands, indeed. However, he seemed to have no such concerns with 
regard to possible outcomes of the policy he proposed. 
53) See Harada, Chosen no Kaikoku to Kindaika, p.25. 
54) Ten thousand Korean Confucian scholars led by Yi Man-Son 
memorialized “Youngnam Manin So” to the King (Its text is found in Nihon 
Gaiko Monjo, vol.14, pp.372-375 and Cho Il-Moon, tr. and annotated, 
Choson Chaengnyak, pp.134-137). The “10,000 man protests” vehemently 
criticized both the argument of Russian threats and the policy of “keeping 
close with China, creating ties with Japan and allying with the United 
States” as baseless. 
55) Fujita Yuji, Ajia ni okeru Bunmei no Taiko: Joi-ron to Shukyu-ron ni 
kansuru Nihon, Chosen, Chugoku no Hikaku Kenkyu (Opposition of 
Civilizations in East Asia: Comparative Studies of Anti-foreignism and 
Conservatism in Japan, Korea and China), Ochanomizu Shobo, Tokyo, 2001, 
pp.204-205. 
